Models of division of powers in modern federations

Автор: Шилова Елизавета Романовна

Организация: РАНХиГС

Населенный пункт: г. Москва

Introduction

This analysis examines the models of separation of powers in modern federations and proves the thesis that in the modern world there is no universal or a priori optimal model of separation of powers in the federation. The stability and effectiveness of the federal system are determined not so much by the formal consolidation of one or another "pure" model (dualistic or cooperative), as by its ability to dynamically adapt. The key to success is the creation of effective institutions for vertical and horizontal cooperation and ensuring genuine, rather than declarative, financial autonomy for the subjects of the federation.

First, it should be said about the identified aspect of federalism – the paradox, which consists in the desire to combine ensuring the political and economic unity of the state with guarantees of the diversity of its components. This paradox is called fundamental dualism and finds its institutional embodiment in specific models of separation of powers – systems of distribution of legislative, executive and, most importantly, financial powers between the federal center and the subjects of the federation[1]. In an era of global challenges, these constitutional structures are being put to an unprecedented test of strength and flexibility[2].

The federation is understood here as a complex political system based on the constitutional consolidation of the division of power between the central government and the governments of its constituent parts, each of which acts directly on its population[3].

The separation of powers model is an institutional and legal design that defines the distribution of competence between these levels. The two ideal types of this design – dualistic (clear delineation of spheres) and cooperative (close intertwining of powers) federalism – serve as the main guidelines for comparative analysis.

In the following, we will trace the historical evolution of approaches to the separation of powers, conduct a comparative analysis of key modern models using the example of specific countries, explore the critical role of institutions of interaction and fiscal federalism, and analyze how these models adapt to the challenges of the 21st century.

1. Theoretical foundations and evolution of approaches to the separation of powers in federalism

The gradual development of federal models represents a movement from strict separation to complex and complex interaction.

Historical retrospective

Historically, the United States has been a classic illustration of the dualistic model, often metaphorically referred to as the “layer cake”. Its essence consists in a clear constitutional division of the spheres of exclusive competence of the federation and the states with minimal requirements for interaction between them. The states have so-called residual competence and broad police powers.[4]. The upheavals of the 20th century made rigid dualism unviable, and at the same time there was a need for joint solutions of complex tasks, which led to the formation of a cooperative model “marble cupcake”, where areas of joint competence prevail. This model assumes constant institutionalized interaction and large-scale financial transfers to achieve common goals. The canonical example here is Germany, where the principle of "loyalty to the federation" obliges the levels of government to cooperate.

Key criteria for comparative analysis.

To systematize the diversity of federal systems, several key criteria can be identified. First, it is a method of allocating powers: exclusive, competing (joint) and framework (defining common principles). Secondly, the principle of exercising powers: there is a distinction between “executive federalism”, where laws are often adopted by the center and executed by the subjects (Germany, partly the EU), and “legislative federalism”, where the subjects themselves adopt and execute laws in their field (USA)[5]. Finally, the most material criterion is the financial autonomy of subjects, which can range from the right to set and collect their own taxes to almost complete dependence on regulated federal transfers[6].

2. Comparative analysis of modern models

Modern federations are complex hybrids, in which, however, one can distinguish the dominant logic of construction.

The integration (cooperative) model: the example of Germany.

The German model is based on the idea of the close integration of lands into the national administration. The constitutional design assigns a significant place to competing and framework legislation. The key institution ensuring integration is the Bundesrat, the Chamber of Lands, through which the regions directly influence federal law-making. Germany's fiscal system is a prime example of cooperation: It includes a complex mechanism of vertical and horizontal “financial equalization” aimed at smoothing differences in the budgetary provision of land.[7].

Strengths: ensuring uniform social standards throughout the country, high cohesion and efficiency in solving national tasks such as infrastructure projects.

Weaknesses: the erosion of political responsibility ("who is to blame?"), the bureaucratization of decision-making processes, and the restriction of political and economic diversity and healthy competition between regions.

The decentralized (dualistic) model: the examples of the USA and Switzerland.

This model, in various variations, advocates the maximum possible autonomy of subjects. In the United States, it is based on the 10th Amendment to the Constitution and the broad police powers of the states, which have significant fiscal autonomy. Switzerland brings this principle to its logical conclusion by enshrining the principle of subsidiarity in the constitution: the cantons have all the power that is clearly not transferred to the federation and actively use the institutions of direct democracy (referendums, popular initiatives) to resolve key issues[8].

Strengths: creation of "laboratories of democracy" and political innovation (states and cantons are experimenting with different policies), consideration of local specifics and a clear division of responsibility between levels of government.

Weaknesses: the risk of growing inter-regional inequalities in the quality and accessibility of public services, difficulties in implementing coherent national policies, and legal fragmentation.

Asymmetric and hybrid models.

Real-world practice often deviates from symmetrical designs. Canada demonstrates a combination of constitutional asymmetry (Quebec's special status in matters of language and civil law) with administrative asymmetry, when the federal government enters into various agreements with individual provinces.

The Russian Federation is a formally mixed model with elements of asymmetry, but in political practice it is characterized by a high concentration of real power and financial powers in the center[9]. This turns the subjects of the federation primarily into executors of federal policy, forming a model of so-called “managerial federalism”, where the division of powers is often not legal, but administrative and administrative in nature[10]. Thus, most modern federations are hybrids in which elements of cooperation and dualism are combined in unique proportions.

3. Critical performance factors: Intergovernmental relations and fiscal federalism

The formal constitutional design is only the framework of the federation. Its viability is determined by the functioning of two key systems: interaction institutions and financial mechanisms.

Institutions of interaction of federalism.

These institutions - formal (meetings of heads of government and relevant ministers, intergovernmental committees) and informal (networks of experts, political agreements) - play a crucial role in the day-to-day functioning of the federation[11]. They serve as channels for policy coordination, information exchange, conflict mitigation, and, most importantly, for adapting rigid constitutional norms to new, unforeseen challenges.

In the context of multilevel governance, for example, in the EU, such interactions become even more complex, involving supranational, national and subnational levels[12]. Effective IGRs help build trust between the central and regional elites, which is the foundation of the federation's sustainability.

Fiscal federalism is the material basis of autonomy.

The political autonomy of a federal subject is fictitious without corresponding financial independence. The key issue here is the balance between income sources and expenditure obligations of each level of government.

Vertical imbalance (when the expenses of regions exceed their own revenues) is a characteristic feature of most federations. It is compensated for by a system of inter-budget transfers. However, the design of this system is critically important. General grants (block grants) strengthen the real autonomy of the regions, allowing them to determine their own spending priorities.

At the same time, excessive use of targeted subsidies (subventions) can turn into a tool of petty federal control, undermining regional initiative and creating the problem of “soft budget constraints” when regions rely on being rescued from the center in case of financial difficulties. A sustainable model requires either significant entities' own tax powers, or a transparent and predictable transfer system that does not discredit local tax capacity building efforts.

4. Modern challenges and model adaptation

Modernity poses new challenges to federal systems, forcing them to reconsider established models of interaction.

Globalization and supranational institutions such as the European Union create an environment of "multilevel governance" where powers are dispersed between supranational, national and regional levels. This requires the national federations (Germany, Belgium, Austria) to build even more complex coordination mechanisms to effectively represent their interests in Brussels and implement pan-European solutions at home.

Challenges of the 21st century, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, have exposed both the weaknesses and the possibilities of different models. The crisis required unprecedented operational coordination even in traditional dualistic systems, while simultaneously testing the regions' ability to act independently in an emergency. Cross-border issues such as cybersecurity, environmental disasters, and migration flow also increase the demand for cooperative mechanisms.

Finally, centrifugal tendencies and separatism remain a constant challenge. Rigid centralization in response to such challenges can backfire, fueling discontent, while providing greater cultural and financial autonomy within a flexible, asymmetric model, as the experience of Canada and, to some extent, India shows[13][14]. It can serve as a tool for preserving the integrity of the state.

Conclusion

The analysis confirms the initial thesis that there is no universal model of separation of powers in the federation. The integration (cooperative) model, exemplified by Germany, ensures unity and social cohesion at the cost of some limitation of regional diversity. The decentralized (dualistic) model, in its American or Swiss variants, maximizes the autonomy and innovation potential of subjects, but faces the risks of inequality and fragmentation. Real systems, be it Canada or Russia, are unique hybrids with varying degrees of asymmetry and dominance of the center.

The stability and effectiveness of the federation ultimately depend not on the choice of an "ideal" model, but on a triad of interrelated factors.:

1) flexible, but at the same time clear and stable constitutional design that sets the framework for interaction.

2) a developed, legitimate and effective system of intergovernmental relations, acting as a "lubricant" for the federal mechanism and ensuring constant dialogue and building trust.

3) a balanced system of fiscal federalism, which provides subjects with real financial resources to exercise their powers and does not create dependent attitudes.

Thus, the future of federalism lies in the development of adaptive models. These models must be able to combine effective public administration, which is necessary to respond to global challenges, with genuine respect and support for regional diversity, a source of innovation and democratic strength. The formal constitutional model is just a starting point. The true essence and viability of federalism are revealed in the daily, often routine, practice of negotiations, compromises and cooperation between its various levels of government.

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